Jan Stanisław Berson

A classic example of Soviet methods of conquest – Georgia

Of all the conquests carried out by the Soviets between 1918 and 1921, the conquest of Georgia is the most characteristic from the point of view of their methods of operation. Using this example, it can be concluded, without any doubt, that the slogan proclaimed by the Russian Revolution of “the peoples right to decide their own destiny” and the voluntarily concluded bilateral agreements are respected by Moscow only against a well-armed and internally strong opponent.

The history of Georgian-Soviet relations takes on an almost symbolic significance. The ancient Georgian nation, in resurrecting its independence on 26 May 1918, immediately had to deal with both the Red Army and communist disruption inside the country. Almost the day after the solemn act of proclamation of the republic, the young Georgian army had to fight the Red Army for the Sukhumi district (the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus). In July 1918, a communist-inspired uprising broke out in West Georgia (Imeretia) and in the district of Dushetsk (north of Tiflis).

After the sovietisation of Azerbaijan (April 1920), Soviet pressure on Georgia intensifies with redoubled force on both tracks: military and diversionary. The first such attempt was victoriously repulsed by the Georgians. It consisted of instigating a communist coup in Tiflis while attacking the Georgian capital by Red Army troops standing on the border of nearby Azerbaijan. However, the communist coup was nipped in the bud thanks to the heroism of the cadets of the Tiflis officers’ school, after which Georgian troops pushed the Red forces out of the republic’s borders within a week, even though at the same time they almost had to liquidate an uprising by the Ossetian minority, also instigated by Moscow emissaries.

During this first Georgian-Soviet war, hostilities lasted less than two weeks (1-12 May 1920), with a complete defeat for the Reds.

The heroic attitude of the Georgians impressed Moscow to such an extent that already on 7 May, upon hearing that the Soviet army had been repelled from Tiflis, the blame for the invasion was laid on Azerbaijan (already sovietised at the time) and Georgia’s sovereignty was recognised by a solemn act.

The Georgian-Soviet treaty, signed by Karachan[1] on behalf of the Soviets, states, among other things, that “Russia recognises, without reservation, the independence and sovereignty of the Georgian state” and “renounces all interference in Georgian internal affairs”, and undertakes not to tolerate on its territory the presence and activities of any groups and organisations claiming to be the government of Georgia or part of it, as well as all groups and organisations seeking to overthrow the Georgian government. Russia undertakes to use all influence on its allies (here Azerbaijan and Armenia are referred to – the author’s note) to ensure that the groups and organisations mentioned in this agreement are not tolerated on their territories.

At the same time, diplomatic relations were established, and a deputy of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic arrived in Tiflis in the person of Kirov – who was assassinated in 1934 – at the head of a huge staff of some three hundred people. The Moscow “diplomats” immediately got down to “work’ – which of course had nothing to do with their official capacity – and, as early as mid-December 1920, the Georgian security authorities detected an underground communist organization in Tiflis, planning a coup d’état for 15 December, with regular Red Army troops to enter Georgia on the same day. In the 1 December 1936 issue of Moscow’s Pravda, the head of the so-called MOPR, Mrs Stasova, writes in her personal reminiscences of Kirov that, as a Soviet deputy in Georgia, he directed all the subversive “work” in that country. Undoubtedly, Moscow diplomats also took great offence at the time when they were accused of taking too active an interest in the internal affairs of the countries in which they represented their government.

Symptomatically, on the eve of this coup attempt, Chicherin[2] sent a note to Lord Curzon containing... indignant protests against the claims that the Soviets were in any way threatening the independence of Georgia, which they had solemnly recognised.... In the meantime, took place the division of “bourgeois” Armenia between Turkey and the Soviets, who proclaimed on their part of Armenian territory the “Soviet Socialist Republic of Armenia” on 29 November 1920.

Meanwhile, the revived Georgian state achieved a number of successes. On 27 January 1921, Georgia was recognised de iure by the Council of Ambassadors, establishing diplomatic relations with France and, even before that, with Turkey. At the March session of the Council of the League of Nations in 1921, Georgia was to be admitted as a member of the Geneva Assembly.

But on the night of 11-12 February 1921, red troops forming part of the Eleventh Army of the regular Soviet army entered Georgia’s borders. In the border town of Shulaveri, neighboring Armenia, a Georgian “Soviet government” was immediately proclaimed, made up of Georgian communists operating under protection of the aforementioned Eleventh Army.

The Georgian authorities interposed a Soviet MP (Sheiman – Kirov has since been dismissed) who declared that “the invasion was the work of Soviet Armenia, and Moscow knows nothing about it.” The Soviet Armenian representative in Tiflis, for his part, declared that “Armenia is not taking the slightest part in this offensive.” The Georgian government failed to communicate with its MP in Moscow due to a “broken telegraph line,” while on 17 February the then Soviet foreign commissar, Chicherin... offered his mediation in the... Georgian-Armenian conflict, and the Red Army offensive continued unabated. Despite their heroic defence, the Georgians evacuated Tiflis on 25 February, while on 18 March the legitimate Georgian government (headed, incidentally, by Social Democrats) went into exile.

Soviet official sources remain completely silent, both about Moscow’s recognition of Georgian independence and about the history of the invasion. In the Little Soviet Encyclopaedia, we find two lines about all this, proclaiming that “at the beginning of 1921, an uprising of the large numbers of worker-peasant masses broke out, forcing the social-democratic government to flee abroad”.

It should be added that at the time of the occupation of Tiflis by the red troops, the Georgian Communist Party had exactly 733 members, mostly of non-Georgian nationality, as stated by the then secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, Lominadze[3], in a collection of documents published in Tiflis in 1924.

Correspondingly, the socio-economic policies of the Georgian socialist government could not have triggered a “mass uprising.” The fact is that in less than three years in power, 670,000 hectares were expropriated for the benefit of the peasants, leaving only 37,000 in private ownership, with the peasants massively siding with the insurgents during the heroic but bloodily suppressed Georgian uprising of 1924.

However, the communist-induced riots in South Ossetia and in the Dushetskiy district, mentioned at the beginning of this article – subsequently gave Moscow reason to claim that “the occupation of Georgia by the Red Army was solely due to the request of the working masses of Georgia.” “The request” was made, quite simply, by the “provisional Soviet government” in Shulaveri, headed by the imported Communists: Macharadz[4], Mdivani[5], Orakhelashvili[6] and Eliava.

It would also not be out of place to mention that, despite the Georgian Communists being twice caught red-handed in a coup d’état (in May and December 1920), the Communist Party existed perfectly legally in independent Georgia, as the Socialist government did not consider it compatible with its ideology... to embark on a vigorous extermination of communism, led, as Georgian ministers, very ardent patriots by the way, thought at the time, by “the same Marxists as them, only slightly more left-wing”.

Moreover, the socialist ministers failed to ensure the proper development of the armed forces, so that at the critical moment, it was not even possible to arm the mass of volunteers and supply them with ammunition.

These recollections are extremely topical at the present time, when Moscow is acting with suspicious zeal in defence of “legitimate, democratic governments” (abroad, of course), while the Communists repeatedly impose their “cooperation” on socialist parties in the West (including Poland).

The example of Georgia is at the same time eloquent testimony to the fact that Moscow only abides by the international treaties it has signed if it reckons with the (military and moral) strength of the counterparty concerned.

Independent Georgia trusted the treaty of 7 May 1920, in which Moscow solemnly recognised its independence, only to conquer this beautiful and heroic country by treacherous invasion less than ten months after it was signed.

This history was soon forgotten in the West and today one can even read, in some places with appreciation, the gropes of the Moscow press hurled at “fascist states that treat international obligations like a piece of paper.”

But these matters are well remembered by the immediate neighbours, who can respond to any manoeuvres in the field of Moscow’s “struggle for peace” at any time with the question: “and what about Georgia?”

We can believe in security from the East as long as we have a formidable military and vigorously combat anything that might weaken us. It is therefore understandable (from Moscow’s point of view) to see constant attacks on Polish armaments and domestic policy, with the fight against communism by the Polish authorities and society being constantly attacked by Moscow, which officially “does not interfere in the internal affairs of other states”, in the pages of its official press as “clearing the rear in case of anti-Soviet war”. This concern for the fate of communists in neighbouring countries best exposes the essential aims of Soviet policy, which does not forget the example of Georgia, whose armed invasion was preceded by communist-provoked riots.