Włodzimierz Marciniak

Russia in Europe: the Utopia and Anti-utopia of Modernization

In August 2008, Russia seemed to be at the height of her power — her army won the war with Georgia, her diplomats easily led French President Nicolas Sarkozy astray, the North Atlantic Alliance postponed its plans for further expansion into the East, and Gazprom was devising plans to become the largest company in the world in terms of capitalization. However, as early as in September, the “energy superpower rising from its knees” entered a phase of serious perturbations. The economic crisis exposed Russia’s weakness and backwardness. She was unable to balance her economy’s investment needs with the growing income from the export of raw materials. As a result, Russia recorded a significant drop in GDP in 2009, with the crisis revealing her economy’s heavy dependence on external factors. Steamrolled during 2005‒2009, the model of economic development based on state-owned corporations collapsed. Russia most likely entered a long period of stagnation, resulting from the exhaustion of the development opportunities created by the 1990s inconsistent market reforms. Russia is trapped in a backward economic and institutional model threatening her marginalization on the international arena.

The Utopia of Modernization

In that situation, new Russian President Dmitry Medvedev began to discuss the need for deep economic, social, and political reforms, symbolized by projects to develop new technologies, particularly the Skolkovo project — the “Russian Silicon Valley.” In keeping with the Russian ideological tradition dating back at least to Peter I, the response to the crisis was modernization proclaimed by the new President in his famous article “Go Russia!”1 Another Russian ruler, Medvedev referred to “modernization” as a justification for the legitimization of the state which, according to Adam Pomorski, precisely in that context “fulfills the special, inverse obligations of enlightened despotism.”2 The inversion concept of civilizational modernization as a utopia is consistent with the emanatist vision of the world as a phenomenon both discontinuous and holistic, best described by the concepts of the succession of civilizations, historical development cycles, or the social formation theory. Therefore, it is no wonder that the next modernization project was presented in the form of the utopian ideal of 21st-Century Russia: Vision of Desired Tomorrow, prepared in March 2010 by the Center for Development of an Information Society (INSOR) under Igor Yurgens’ supervision.3 The vision of the desired future was reconstructed in a past tense, with the use of a “retrospective look from the future,” which is characteristic of utopias. This makes 21st-Century Russia formally resemble the 19th-century literary utopias, for instance, Nikolay Chernyshevsky’s novel What Is to Be Done?, which utilized a similar device.

Utopias are characterized by hyperbolization of spirit, an idea, science, legislation, or politics. The authors of 21st-Century Russia write that “modernization begins with the right attitude.”4 Thus, in line with emanatist mythology, modernization should proceed “from the desired tomorrow,” basing to a large extent on the intuition and political will of an enlightened minority. For modernization is not a logical consequence of the current development trends. According to Yurgens, inertia is pushing Russia toward perpetuation of her economy’s orientation toward raw materials, deindustrialization, and degradation of the institutional sphere as a result of rampant corruption. Therefore, modernization requires abandonment of the typical methods of carrying out large projects, rejection of “rigid structures,” and creation of “a socio-economic organism that guarantees maximum mobility and freedom of choice.”5 However, abiding by the principle of “non-violence against the future” generates deep pessimism. Reading this report, one can have an impression that its authors consider more likely the inertial model of development, conventionally called “the path toward China.” Yurgens argued in his interview for Nezavisimaya gazeta that should the European-style modernization fail, Russia always has a choice — “there’s China, there’s the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and there’s India.”6

The Russian state’s modernization policy makes a sense of relative deprivation an indispensable element of the attitude toward Russia. The gap (raskol) between the cultural norm and the state reality dates back at least to Patriarch Nikon’s religious reform conducted in the mid-17th century. The cultural inversion that took place was relative not so much to the state as the sphere of cultural diffusion, which shaped the character of modern Russian statehood.7 To the cultural diffusion sphere pertains the Partnership for Modernization program proposed by the European Commission in November 2009 and then accepted at the EU-Russia Summit in Rostov-on-Don in June 2010. At the beginning of the 21st century, the sense of relative deprivation accompanies even the modernization projects themselves. In his speech on “What Is Hindering Russia’s Modernization?” Yurgens pointed to the Russian society’s reluctance to undergo modernization mainly due to human capital degradation. He believes that the economically active portion of the society is characterized by “dequalification, degradation, lumpenization, and debilization.” Therefore, the archaic Russian nation is not to be expected to become “mentally comparable” to “the statistically average progressive Europeans” before 2025.8 As usual, the nation is to blame for the failure of yet another modernization.

Yurgens’ reasoning presented above aptly reflects the pitfalls of utopian thinking which contrasts faithfulness to social ideals with a bad utopia (dystopia).9 According to the authors of the 21st-Century Russia utopia, the negative development tendencies that push Russia to the margins must be overcome. This, however, cannot be done through a logical analysis of the causes. Hence, the escape into the emanatist mythology, and then it turns out that modernization today is the issue of the price “we are willing to pay for the realization of the ideal.”10

The Utopia of the Union of Europe

So what price is Russia willing to pay to realize the ideal of modernization? The authors of the report entitled Towards a Union of Europe, prepared under Sergei Karaganov’s supervision for the Valdai Discussion Club, attempt to answer this question.11 They make two simple assumptions. Firstly, Russia is gradually losing her position of the third global player, alongside the United States and China, and is transforming into a raw material and political appendage not so much to Europe as to Asia, because the 21st century will most likely be the “century of Asia.” Secondly, despite basically being a country of European culture, Russia is not developing in a European way. The rampant corruption blocks the mechanisms of economic and political competition. Russia lacks any internal modernization impulses whatsoever. Her social and political transformation cannot be regarded as a condition for her rapprochement with Europe. The situation is exactly the opposite. The only impulse for Russia’s modernization is her integration with the European Union presented in the form of a political fantasy of the Union (Soyuz) of Europe. Karaganov’s fantasy in many respects corresponds to Yurgens’ “vision of the desired tomorrow.” Interestingly enough, both these texts consider the pessimistic scenario for Russia more likely. The fundamental difference between the two texts is that Yurgens initially assumed that there were forces (“the thinking minority”) capable of carrying out the modernization, while Karaganov a priori presumed a total absence of internal modernization impulses.

Hence, the two reports present two scenarios for Russia — the less likely, “idealistic” one and the more likely, “inertial” one. Since Igor Yurgens and Sergei Karaganov belong to the state authorities’ think tank, their fantasies and realism can both be considered important manifestations of Russia’s strategic thinking.

The threat of the European Union and Russia’s relative marginalization in the near future means that both players are keenly interested in setting up a new historic project such as a union from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific — a Union of Europe. The new Union could become a member of the new Big Three leading the world economy and politics. Otherwise, this role shall be played by the duumvirate of the United States and China. According to Karaganov, the European Union and Russia’s potential closeness could stem from their shared tradition of administrative culture, which with difficulty can be deduced from the emanatist mythology of enlightened despotism, the vitality of which is probably evidenced by the phenomena listed in the report: “the European powers’ desire to play an independent role,” “the increase in the importance of the nation-state,” and “the return to conservative values in politics and economy.” But the problem is that Russian bureaucracy is being gradually weakened by rampant corruption, which is distancing Russia from the “shared administrative tradition.”

In Yurgens’ and Karaganov’ utopias, the foundation of the new international organism should be the Treaty on the Union of Europe, supplemented with a number of sectoral agreements guaranteeing free access to factors of production of goods and services. The “idealistic” project of the Union of Europe is to overcome the continent’s rupture resulting from its military and strategic division. This should be done by limiting the United States’ role in the European security system through Russia’s and other countries’ joining NATO, concluding a treaty on European security, and balancing the relations between the Union of Europe and the United States on the one hand and the Union of Europe and China on the other hand.

The central role in the Union of Europe should be played by the system of reciprocal (perekrostnyi) management of extraction, transport, and sale of natural gas and other energy carriers. This lapidary concept — almost identical in both utopias — might mean that Russia is willing to pay for being saved from civilizational degradation with access to her raw materials and energy sector. “In the united European energy complex,” reads the 21st-Century Russia utopia, “both consumers, who control the distribution, and producers, who control the resources, are equally interested in the fair price for energy and its efficient use.”12 Therefore, the Union of Europe is to be based on a cartel agreement between energy producers and consumers with the omission of the transit states. It turns out that the key moment in both modernization utopias is the reference to very traditional instruments of politics such as raw materials, territories, and agreements between large corporations.

The “Near Abroad”

The authors of the report Towards the Union of Europe argue that if the agreement on the union between Russia and the EU had been concluded back in 2000, many negative trends in Europe could have been avoided. Firstly, the Union could refuse membership to candidate states not fully meeting the membership criteria. Secondly, Russia and the EU would have avoided the disastrous rivalry for the “close abroad,” while the states located between Russia and the “old” European Union would have only benefitted from the project of “joint advancement and development”13 (razvitiya i osvoyeniya). Belarus would be more democratic and Ukraine would have avoided the five-years of the “orange experiment.” Karaganov’s team goes on to fantasize that even the war in Georgia could have been avoided. In line with this reasoning, Central and Eastern European states should pay the price for Russia’s belated modernization, as a result of their joint “development” with Western Europe. By contrast, in the inertial variant, the “structural instability” and rivalry between Russia and the broadly-defined West shall remain in that region.

Generally speaking, the place of our region and Poland in both scenarios of the future course of the Russian foreign policy should perhaps be seen as deriving from their place in the united European energy complex. The said utopias do not discuss the details but they are probably not in the sphere of political strategies, but rather in the sphere of political tactics. Of key importance here shall be the carrying out of the Nord Steam pipeline project and changing the directions of the transmission of Russian natural gas to the countries of the region via Germany. The course of the negotiations on new natural gas agreements seems to confirm that the Polish government has already accepted the principles of “joint advancement and development” proposed to the countries located between the old European Union and Russia, without any clear external pressure, but rather as a result of the rapidly developing internal political crisis and the state’s institutional weakness. The position of the individual countries in the region depends much more on the strength of their economy and on the efficiency of their institutions than on Russia’s policy.

The 21st-Century Russia utopia highlights another aspect of the relations with the “near abroad.” In the desired future, Russia will treat this area not as a sphere of influence, but as a “civilizational sphere.” She will try to turn the successes of her own modernization into soft power instruments to ensure her leadership in the region. Factors important in the Russian policy with regard to the “near abroad” shall be: the Russian language, which is to regain its former popularity, a demographic policy, and recruitment of the labor force. In the inertial variant, however, the civilizational dimension of the Russian policy can be interpreted differently. In the conditions of the institutional weakness of post-communist states, the Russian policy can refer to post-Sovietism as the cultural heritage of the communist party empire, entrenched to a different degree in many countries of the region.

The Inertial Scenario

But nothing suggests that the idealistic scenario can come true. Russia and the European Union are actually competing for the spot of the third player in the emerging USA‒PRC bipolar system. This competition cannot end in victory of either side and it is objectively weakening both the EU and the Russian Federation. Both sides will probably prove helpless in the face of yet another turn in US policy, which may follow the failure of the current administration’s foreign policy. The realization of the “roadmaps” and the “partnership for modernization” will lead to a fragmentation of bilateral cooperation rather than to Russia’s modernization, all the more so as Russia can already acquire modern technologies and capital from directions other than the West. Discouraging Moscow through formal cooperation with the European Union shall push Russia more and more often toward a traditional bilateral policy.

The consequences of the inertial scenario may be as follows: Russia’s exclusion from the process of making decisions of paramount importance for the world; implementation of Russian projects to change the European security architecture exclusively below the “minimum plan;” lowering Russia’s position to that of China’s junior partner; returning to the concept of NATO enlargement in the event of a change to the US policy; a decline in Russian exports to European countries over the next 5‒10 years; and an increase in diplomatic disputes and conflicts between Russia and the individual European countries. The inertial scenario does not seem to be more favorable for Central and Eastern European countries, for it assumes the implementation of a policy similar to that in the idealist scenario, but in a much more conflicted environment. The emergence of local political players as large as the United States and China may give countries such as Poland a new opportunity to pursue their own policy.

The Anti-Utopia of Modernization

In the second half of the 19th century, emerged a new type of utopian thinking called anti-utopia. It is not a negation of utopia, but more like its transformation. If utopias represent the desired social ideal, then anti-utopias show the undesirable effects of the present course of events. Anti-utopias usually reduce to absurdity the characteristics of an ideology or policy. Adam Pomorski listed several distinguishing features of anti-utopia as a literary genre which seem important to this analysis: anti-satiricalness (a parable more than a pamphlet); ironic or auto-ironic anti-doctrinairism; showing the dynamics of utopias’ degeneration into anti-utopias; showing the irreconcilable opposites of social ideals; contrasting the anti-utopian ideal of humanity with social utopias.14 Fyodor Dostoevsky’s Notes from Underground featured a parable of Nikolay Chernyshevsky’s What Is to Be Done? with its phalansteries and houses of glass. Criticizing the Bolsheviks’ agricultural policy, eminent economist Alexander Chayanov published in 1920 his famous anti-utopia entitled Puteshestvie moego brata Alekseia v stranu krest’ianskoi utopii [My brother Alexei’s journey into the land of peasant utopia]. Yevgeny Zamyatin in his book We and Andrei Sinyavsky’ in Lyubimov presented the world of a realized utopia as a world in which there was no place for man. The essential advantage of anti-utopias is that they restore the importance of analytical thinking, which is essentially eliminated from utopias.

A response to Medvedev’s article “Go, Russia!” was an ironic vision of a bioagrocomplex presented by Maxim Kalashnikov.15 In late 2009, economist Anton Oleinik published an article “Moscow 2042 Ruled by the Market,16 the title of which alludes to Vladimir Voinovich’s novel Moscow 2042. Oleinik’s article is a parable of the united European energy complex, which is central to Yurgens’ and Karavanov’s utopias. At the same time it shows the dynamics of the degeneration of “the energy superpower rising from its knees” (a liberal empire) into an anti-utopia.

In 2042, the next incarnation of the Supreme Power, which used to be exercised by the court, then by the court chancellery, next by the Central Committee, and now by the Presidential Administration,17 is the Service of the Guardians of National Resources. The Service was formed by way of merger of two currently existing institutions — the Presidential Administration and the Federal Anti-Monopoly Service, with its legal basis being the Act of 2008 (the “Energy Decree”), which regulates foreign investors’ access to economy sectors of strategic importance. The Service of the Guardians controls the process of creating the unified European energy complex, which is central to Yurgens’ and Karaganov’s modernization utopias. In Oleinik’s ironic vision, the wielding of power consists in subjecting to one’s will the “streams” flowing within this complex.

In the liberal empire, the government consists of two ministries. Gazprom has been transformed back into a ministry. Called the Ministry of Foreign Energy Policy, it manages the Northern, Southern, and Blue “streams” connecting Russia with the European Union member states, the Russian energy bases and the “corridors of energy friendship” that connect them. The Ministry’s main task is to maintain high prices for energy carriers. It also grants particularly deserving Europeans bonuses in cash, scholarships at the Gubkin Russian State University of Oil and Gas, and badges of honor to “distinguished employees of the natural gas industry.” The other Ministry making up the Russian government is the Ministry of Internal Market, operating under the Act on Basic Principles of State Regulation of Trading Activities” (the so-called Trade Decree). The Ministry’s main task is to maintain high retail prices for goods and services through a network of megamarkets. In the liberal empire, the state policy in the sphere of health, education, culture, and social affairs has been replaced with commercial services. Thus created within the Ministry of Internal Market were departments for the market of medical, educational, etc., services. The Ministry of Defense has been transformed into the department for security of the facilities of the Ministry of External Energy Policy.

Most positions in the Service of the Guardians and in both Ministries are held by members of the Liberal Police Party of Russia. The longtime conflict between the two factions of the elite — the “liberals” and the “siloviki” — ended in a historic compromise as both sides realized that that was the only way for them to retain power. After the formation of the new party and its takeover of the Service of the Guardians, the state power ministries — of defense, of internal affairs, and the state security — were dissolved. Only those whose life experience included working in both state organs and on the market were able to comprehend the originality and depth of the liberal-police concept and thus retain their place in the Supreme Power. They also reached a consensus on how to reproduce it, both among consumers of mass-produced commodities, that is the population, and among consumers of Russian energy carriers, that is the international community. For the Market wields its power using three instruments — high prices for energy carriers, high prices for goods and services, and state regulation of access to the market.

In Oleinik’s utopia there is no place for Russia as a historical, cultural, and religious fact. For she has been reduced to Gazprom and the Service of the Guardians, and in a broader sense to the raw material and energy complex and the interests of those who rule it. Thus reduced Russia can be described as Gazruthenia, whose relations with European countries have been limited to two simple relations — the sale of raw materials at the highest prices possible and the reproduction of the Supreme Power, whose the course depends also on pulling the international community into the circulation of the post-Soviet political culture. Oleinik’s ironic transformation of Medvedev’s modernization ideas also applies to Yurgens’ and Karaganov’s utopias, which constitute a concretization of the President’s ideas. For the modernization is based on the pairing of the market and power as well as on the triumph of historical optimism, represented by the Liberal Police Party of Russia. The optimism of Oleinik’s anti-utopia matches Yurgens’ and Karaganov’s idealistic political scenarios consisting in Gazruthenia’s close integration with the European Union. By contrast, the inertial political scenario forecasts a closer rapprochement between Russia and China.

Oleinik’s anti-utopia allows us to better understand the place of Poland and of other countries of the region. In both cases, like most inhabitants of Russia, they are to play the role of pessimists, that is those who bear the costs of Moscow being ruled by the market, for example, as a result of high natural gas prices. The most important “streams” (the Northern, Southern, and Blue ones) that bind together the United European energy complex will probably bypass the territories of Poland, Belarus, and Ukraine. Instead, the “corridors of energy friendship” that connect Russian energy bases can run across their territory. According to Oleinik, the only way for the natives to avoid the sad fate of pessimists is to join the party of optimists, that is, the Liberal Police Party of Russia early enough, namely 30 or 35 years before 2042.

The anti-utopias not so much paint pictures of the future as they reduce to absurdity the bad features of reality. Thus, the answer to the anti-utopia nightmare lies not in the future, but in the present. The future position of Poland will probably depend on her economic strength, institutional efficiency, and ability to represent and defend the Polish interests in the European Union. Last but not least, Gazprom scholarships should not be accepted.