texts

Leon Chrzanowski

The significance and the essence of the Eastern Question

For half a century one of the most important political issues in Europe has been “the Eastern question”. Every now and then a cloud appears on the eastern horizon of the political world, a dispute arises in Turkey or between Turkey and Moscow, and Western diplomats immediately fear that this cloud will produce a dangerous storm, which they call “the Eastern question”. Almost every year since the 1850s there has been a discussion in Europe over one of the hundred questions arising from the Eastern question.

When the Muscovite army crosses the Danube, crosses the Balkans, conquers the Danube fortresses and advances victoriously on Constantinople (1829)..., or when the Sultan's powerful liegeman, the Viceroy of Egypti , seizes Syria, enters Asia Minor, smashes the Turkish army at Konya, intends to drive the Sultanii out of Istanbul , who, threatened, accepts the dangerous though temporarily effective help offered to him by the Tsar (1833)...., or when the Tsar wants through his envoy to dictate laws to the Sublime Porte as the sole protector of Christians in Turkey and imposes Moscow's protection on that state (1853)... , the frightened European cabinets cry out that the “Eastern question” could lead to a great war. When there is a dispute over the maintenance of the neutrality of the Black Sea in order to secure Constantinople against the sudden assault of the Moscow fleet and thus free the Sublime Porte from the influence of Tsarist diplomacy; when one of the many quarrels between Serbia and the Turkish government breaks out; when a Christian-Slavic population in Bosnia and Herzegovina rises up against the Turkish pasha or fighting starts in the Greek islands between Turks and Greeks trying to throw off the Muslim yoke; when there are fights between the Druzes and the Maronites in Lebanon, or the Montenegrins and the armies of the pasha of Skadar; when the Sultan declares an edict introducing internal reforms, or when there is the matter of ensuring freedom of navigation on the Danube by moving Moscow's positions and borders away from that river by treaty; when Moldavia and Wallachia unite to form a single state called Romania and strive for complete independence; or when Moscow, having defeated and eradicated the brave Caucasian peoples, extends its annexation beyond the Caucasus and threatens Asiatic Turkey – all these arguments, clashes, entanglements, struggles, agreements, reforms and national movements called the “Eastern question” are the multiple disputed issues arising from this one question.

But what is in fact the substance and core of the Eastern question?

It is to stop in the East the invasive activities of the Muscovite empire founded on conquests and living by plunder, and to prevent the Tsarist Empire from taking over the countries and peoples hitherto constituting the weakened and disintegrating Ottoman monarchy, which is in a state of complete internal transformation: that is one side of the eastern question, that is one half of its essence. The other main side is the complete internal transformation of the Turkish state, which, based on conquest, is breaking down into its elements, and the transformation is appropriate to the freedom of each nation and its free development. In a word, the other core of the eastern question is the creation of a new life and new states or a federation of nationsiii out of the decaying Turkish monarchy, which in its present state can no longer exist.

These two sides, these two directions of the eastern question: the stopping of Moscow's expansive activities in the east and the transformation of the countries comprising Turkey respective to the freedom of each nation, are so closely linked, so interwoven, that in each of the thousand disputes and questions arising out of this question both these aspects are relevant, both these directions show their importance.

Let us consider more closely these intertwined aspects of the Eastern question.

Well known in Europe, but insufficiently researched, is the Muscovite, i.e. Varangian-Tartar, imperial government’s possessiveness, persistence and relentlessness in its efforts to subjugate and incorporate all the Slavic peoples, to break them, to rob them of their identity, to degenerate them spiritually, that is, to strip them of the qualities of the Slavic spirit striving for the development of individual freedom (as the Tsars once did with Novgorod and Pskov), to grind the conquered peoples into a uniform assemblage from which the tsars’ empire is formed. Also well known, though not duly fathomed, are Moscow’s two-centuries’ persistent and incessant efforts to undermine, overthrow and subjugate all the neighboring states, one by one; at first these efforts were turned against Pskov, Greater Novgorod, the countries of southern Rus’, Astrakhan, Crimea, etc.; then against Sweden, Poland, Turkey, Austria, the Caucasian and Transcaucasian peoples, Persia, Khiva, the Turkic countries and China, and even reaching across central Asia to British India. Not secret, but not precisely known, are the thousands of ways and means of deceit and violence, hypocrisy and insolence, betrayal and brute force with which Moscow has prepared and is preparing, has fulfilled and is fulfilling its conquests in Europe and Asia. On several occasions, European governments and peoples, individually or in alliance, have even taken diplomatic and even military action to stop its invasion. But so far Europe has failed to adopt any radical measure to put an end to Moscow’s conquests and seizures, and the measures hitherto taken have been poorly conceived and incompetently implemented.

Moscow’s aspirations for conquest go primarily in two directions. Firstly, it aims at complete subjugation of the whole of Poland and all the Slavic peoples, and in general of all the peoples of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy except the Germans; secondly, it aims at the seizure of the countries and peoples which make up present-day Turkey.

Its conquest in the first direction is attempted under the pharisaic slogan of “Pan-Slavism”, i.e. the unification of the Slavic peoples. And indeed, the falsest slogan of all, with which treacherous despotism seeks to lure people and peoples under its yoke, is the Pan-Slavism proclaimed by the Muscovite agents. For this supposed liberation and unification of the Slavic peoples by Moscow is in reality the subjugation of every Slavic nation by a state born out of their spiritual destruction; it is the eradication of the identity of every Slavic nation, the obliteration of their character, mission and national characteristics, depriving them of their spirit. For there is nothing in the world more opposed to the spirit of the Slavic tribe – which developed most strongly in the Polish nation, and has pursued and is pursuing the liberation of individuals, as the profound thinker Montesquieuiv has already recognized – than Moscow’s intention and effort directed towards the obliteration and destruction of all individualism.

The Muscovite government is attempting to cover its conquest in the other direction, i.e. its actions to seize the countries and peoples which make up Turkey, not only with the deceptive flag of Pan-Slavism, but also with the hypocritical banner of the liberation of Christians from the Muslim yoke, although it brings them subjection a hundred times heavier and more fatal to them than Turkish rule.

Moscow began its invasive actions against Turkey as soon as it became its neighboring country. This, in turn, was at a time when the warrior spirit had declined in the Ottomans, while the desire for independence was awakening in the peoples they had conquered, and amidst internal disturbances the Ottoman state began to decline. After tearing Poland apart at the end of the last century – which Moscow initiated and in which it played the main role, as the now comprehensively explained historical facts showv – Moscow turned its invasion efforts primarily against Turkey, but also against its other neighbors. For a hundred years it has been using all means and all methods to undermine and overthrow the Turkish state, with the aim not of liberating but of seizing the countries and subjugating the peoples constituting this monarchy. It meddles in all of Turkey's internal affairs in order to further weaken it and extend its own influence within it. Sometimes it acts as the protector of the Greeks and Slavic peoples oppressed by the Turks, and sometimes as the guarantor of the integrity of the Turkish state and as the Sultan's ally, as it imposes its assistance on him in his fight against the rebellious Viceroy of Egypt. It secretly bribes members of the divan and gives money to the fanatical Turkish faction inciting them to resist the internal reforms undertaken by the Sublime Porte and aimed at the equality of peoples in the Ottoman state. At the same time Moscow loudly proclaims to be the sole protector of Christians in Turkey and seeks to remove other Christian powers from this protection, and in the name of defending Christians and liberating Slavic and Greek peoples, wages war against the Turks with the sole aim of bringing these peoples under its yoke. For Moscow’s goal is not the overthrow of Turkish rule and the liberation of the peoples once conquered by the Ottomans, but the annexation of the countries inhabited by these peoples and their subjugation.

The Western powers, even Austria, have already become well aware of Moscow's aspirations towards Turkey. And, sensing that if the tsar were to become master of Constantinople, Moscow's despotism would threaten the whole of Europe, they seek to halt Moscow's conquest in the weakened Ottoman state. In fact, it is by no means Europe's aim, or at least it should not be, to preserve Turkish rule over countries once conquered by the Turks; its aim is to prevent Moscow from seizing these countries.

For half a century, and especially since 1833, the European powers have had to step in almost every year, directly or indirectly, diplomatically and even militarily, to temporarily curb Moscow's influence and supremacy in Turkey, to settle disputes between the tsar’s government and the Sublime Porte, or to resolve internal problems in the Ottoman state. But although in 1853 half of Europe fought against Moscow in order to shield the countries constituting Turkey from Moscow's invasion, the Ottoman state is now again falling under Moscow's influence, and the invasion-minded tsars’ state is now more threatening to Turkey than at the time when Menshchikov, entering the divan meeting with a rod, wanted to dictate laws to the Sublime Porte on behalf of the tsar and demanded that Turkey accept Moscow's protection. The reason for this state of affairs is that no radical measures have so far been adopted to put a definite end to Moscow's conquest activities and to resolve the eastern question completely; European diplomacy has contented itself with protecting Turkey for a while from Moscow’s invasion by means of a temporary alleviation of the current dispute arising from the eastern question, and has always postponed its ultimate resolution.

The radical means of stopping Moscow not only in its endeavors to seize the countries on the Thracian peninsula, but also in its invasive actions against all neighboring peoples and states, is to close Moscow within its natural boundaries by restoring an independent Poland. For this measure to be truly radical and effective, it must not be confined to conferring apparent independence on just one part of the Polish country, as it was done in 1815; rather, complete sovereignty must be restored to the whole of Poland, which would have sufficient forces to defend its independence. Or preferably, the European powers wishing to put an end to the conquests carried out by Moscow, posing danger to all enlightened nations, should give effective assistance to the Polish nation so that it may regain a truly independent existence all over its lands. Moscow now advances its conquests with the forces of the peoples it has subjugated, and especially with the forces of the Polish and Ruthenian countries it has seized, but if it is confined to its own land, it will not have the strength to undertake conquest. A war against Moscow to take away the Polish lands and restore Poland's independence, and thus decisively stop Moscow's conquest efforts against both Turkey and Austria, would require less effort and fewer sacrifices from the powers engaged in such a struggle than the Eastern War of 1853 and 1854, in which France and Austria, having failed to set a higher goal for the struggle, wasted enormous resources and thousands of lives on the temporary defense of Turkey.

In the present state of affairs in Europe the above task would be easier to accomplish, Moscow would be more effectively restrained in its conquest, the independence, freedom and nationality of both the Polish nation and other Central European peoples would be better secured if the Polish countries taken from Moscow and united into one entity, if this independent Poland was in a federal union with Hungary, with the Croatian-Slovenian kingdom, with Serbia and Romania. In a word, if the nations between the Baltic and the Danube, i.e. Polish, Hungarian, Croatian-Slovenian, Serbian, Romanian, were to form a union for the common defense of the freedom and integrity of each of them in the face of the two great neighboring powers: the united Germany and the expansion-minded Moscow. This is the kind of union of nations, a union state under a common dynasty, into which Austria should be transformed, as the German countries remain with it only for the time being and they will soon be united with Germany. Even if all of the above-mentioned nations were now independent, rational political thought would advise them that in the vicinity of two enormous powers it was reasonable to enter into a military alliance, or perhaps an even closer union, with the neighboring peoples, who are also under threat. Well, such a military alliance could be secured by a common ruler. This shows how natural it would be in the present situation if Austria were to transform itself into such a union state, i.e. if the above-mentioned peoples were to enter into one union, and how this would not in any way threaten the independence of any of them, but would rather more strongly secure their freedom and national development.

If this union of the Polish, Hungarian, Croatian-Dalmatian-Slovenian and Serbian peoples were to be joined not only by Romania, but also by Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro and Bulgaria, or if the peoples on the Thracian peninsula (including Greece) were to form a separate union allied to the federation of peoples between the Baltic and the Danube, the eastern question, in both its main directions, would be comprehensively and completely resolved. That is, Moscow’s conquest tendencies would be radically curbed in Europe and the Turkish state would be transformed according to the interests of each nation.

For several years now some statesmen have been convinced that only by resolving these two questions can the eastern question be decisively settled. However, seeing that neither the Western governments want to adopt this radical way of solving the matter, nor the peoples under Turkish rule are yet capable of forming independent states by their own efforts and after the overthrow of Turkey they would become Moscow's prey, but also fearing the threatening growth of Moscow through its incessant conquests, and realizing how terrible it would become for the freedom of nations if it took possession of the Thracian peninsula and Constantinople, these statesmen have been working on at least temporarily halting the Muscovite invasion and defending Turkey for the present. They have been well aware that the Ottoman state cannot be sustained for long in its present condition, but their aim has been to ensure that the peoples comprising Turkey today are not subjugated by Moscow before they are able to transform themselves into new states suited to their national aspirations, because in this way Moscow would become even more dangerous for Europe. Thus, taking into account the situation in which they have been operating and the means in their power, which every man of action must take into account, they have at least tried at every step to counteract Moscow's actions in Turkey, to prevent new conquests in the East and to limit Moscow’s influence, and at the same time they have been urging the Turkish government to make reforms aimed at preparing the internal transformation of the state or at increasing the means of opposing Moscow. While doing this work, at the right moments they clearly indicated to England and France (Gen. Chrzanowski certainly did) the only solution which would permanently secure the constituent countries of Turkey from Moscow's annexation and would create an unbreakable dam to Moscow's lust for conquest.

 

The excerpt presented here is Section I: Zarys i istota spraw wschodniej – stanowcze jej rozwiązanie. Zaborcza dążność cesarstwa moskiewskiego względem wszystkich państw sąsiednich i dwa jej główne kierunki of Wojciech Chrzanowski’s analysis Sprawa wschodnia i zarys zdarzeń dziejowych w Turcyi i krajach zachodnio-azyatyckich od 1830 do 1842 r., published in the volume Pisma wojskowo-polityczne, podawane rządom polskiemu, angielskiemu, francuskiemu, tureckiemu i piemonckiemu przez jenerała Wojciecha Chrzanowskiego w okresie czasu od 1830 do 1856 r. wydał i objaśnił zarysami współczesnych zdarzeń dziejowych Leon Chrzanowski, vol. I, Kraków 1871, pp. 15-24.

 

 

i I.e. Muhammad Ali Pasha, cf. footnote 6 in Wojciech Chrzanowski’s text.

 

ii Mahmud II (1785-1839) - Sultan of Turkey of the Ottoman dynasty, ruled from 1808 to 1839, reformer of the state (including abolishing the Janissaries), struggled against the Greek uprising, waged a losing war against Russia and fought against the Viceroy of Egypt Muhammad Ali Pasha; he had to accede to the independence of Greece, the autonomy of Moldavia and Wallachia and the loss of Algeria to France.

 

iii Perhaps new kingdoms will arise from the south-eastern Turkish provinces, when Thessaly, Macedonia and part of Thrace join Greece, and the Slavic countries of Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Montenegro and Romania join the great federal union of nations which should be formed from Poland, Hungary and the Slovenian-Dalmatian-Croatian kingdom, in a word, from the nations living between the united Germany and the Muscovite empire and threatened by these two powers. Such a union of nations should be initiated by the transformed Austria, and the common ruler of the Habsburg dynasty, the Austrian Emperor, could bind this union of nations. I shall explain my thoughts on this subject in more detail, indicating in this outline a radical way of resolving the eastern question [author’s note from the original edition].

 

iv Charles Louis de Secondat Baron de la Bredé et de Montesquieu (1689-1755) - French philosopher, jurist and politician. His treatise The Spirit of Law (De l'esprit des lois, 1748) is considered one of the most important treatises in political philosophy. Montesquieu's concept of the tri-partite system of government is an invariably important point of reference in discussions about the desired political model. He also wrote, among others, Persian Letters (Lettres persanes, 1721) and Considerations on the causes of the greatness of the Romans and their decline (Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence, 1734).

 

v In another analysis I demonstrate the facts proving that the idea of overthrowing and annexing the whole of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth originally arose not in the mind of the Prussian rulers, but in the mind of Peter I, the Muscovite tsar, who took decisive actions with the aim of one day seizing the whole of Poland. Then the Prussian kings tried to bend this idea to their own advantage. Therefore the plan for the seizure of the whole of Poland by Moscow, which the Muscovite rulers from Peter I onwards tried to carry out, was changed by the Prussian kings into a design for the partition of Poland between the neighboring states, which in its consequences was perhaps even more harmful to Poland.

Whenever Moscow's plan to seize the whole of the Commonwealth became more apparent, and the tsars, having extended their corrupting influence over Poland, prepared to fulfill this plan, the Prussian kings opposed it with a design for the partition of Poland among its neighbors. The tsars repelled this idea of partition as long as they trusted that they alone would be able to seize the whole of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; and only having lost this trust did they agree to share the seizure they had intended. I prove the truth of this reasoning by presenting historical facts in another of my writings, which I am publishing concurrently [author’s note from the original edition].