Aleksander Wielopolski

Note Submitted to Lord Palmerston by Messenger of Poland in March 1831

After the incidents that occurred in their country in late November last year,i the Poles sent to St. Petersburg their conditions for treaties, having already announced that should justice be denied to them, they would declare their Homeland’s independence. The denial did occur and Poland was declared independent. The more prominent European cabinets witnessed the moderation exhibited by the Polish people in their initial steps, of which the former became certain based not only on the general statements that reached entire Europe, but also on the specific appeals sent by the provisional Government of Poland for mediation in support of the demands formulated on the basis of official treaties. The cabinets were also well aware of how St. Petersburg reacted to their taking the side of the Poles, who were denied a guarantee of their due rights, freedoms, nationality, and self-existence other than the renewed old promises. And the fifteen-year experience had already shown how seriously such promises should be taken. The Poles then found out that the main obstacle to their maintenance of their existence vouchsafed to them by Europe was the incorporation of Poland into Russia, particularly when the St. Petersburg court shirked all the obligations which it had assumed as a result of that annexation with respect to major European powers, especially England. That court had sufficiently proved that all the promises it signed at the Congress of Vienna were only a means to retain the earlier annexed parts of Poland, the return of which Europe had already begun to demand, as well as to acquire a new partition in the form of a large part of the Duchy of Warsaw.

Until the declaration of Polish independence, the Sejm had not at all been constrained by the staunch faction’s insistence. Vast majority of the nation and the Sejm, which is its organ, managed to resist that faction’s cries as long as that step could be considered too eager, before the exhaustion of all means of reconciliation. But at last what initially might have seemed that faction’s unreasonable demand became in the course of events a reasonable wish of the entire nation, unwavering in its resolve to not yield and to always act with moderation.

In the Polish provinces incorporated into the Empire, a lot of the inhabitants lived in the Kingdom of Poland. Following orders given to them by their compatriots from the lands occupied by Russian troops, they submitted to the Chambers an act of their accession, on those provinces’ behalf, to all the decisions of the Warsaw Sejm, and that act was officially adopted. Since the beginning of the revolution, many prominent inhabitants of those provinces have been actively involved in the Government, including its prime minister, Prince Czartoryski,ii and the commander-in-chief, Prince Radziwiłł.iii

Now the Polish nation pins everything on the principle recently proclaimed by its representatives, and henceforth, on account of the moral state of the nation, Poland and Polish independence should consider themselves inclusive and inseparable. The principle of a nation’s independence cannot die unless the nation itself dies. This state of affairs in Poland is a European occurrence, affecting the entire social structure of the civilized world. If it is important for the Polish people that this occurrence be considered in its real sense, then it is no less important for the more prominent European cabinets to consider the nature of this occurrence, the benefits that can be derived from it for the peace and happiness of the European peoples, as well as the dangers that could threaten Europe in its present state, and, last but not least, the way by which the cabinets could obtain the benefits and prevent the dangers.

But because of what happened later, in order to properly investigate this state of affairs, we must go back all the way to the partition of Poland.

Taught by the many calamities it had experienced, the Polish nation lifted itself up from the humiliation to which its neighbors had brought it with impunity, and on 3 May 1791 passed the constitution adapted to its needs, consistent with its past and relics of history, a constitution which was to establish happy concord between all the classes and ensure their prosperity.

Europe was glad to see that improvement, which, by solidifying Poland’s political existence, was to make the Polish nation the mainstay of true freedom and independence, as well as of order and permanence of other states. But fate would have it that Poland lost her independence precisely when she gained the most rights to use it. The same criminal attack that deprived Poland of political existence introduced Russia into the European states system. Hence, in Europe there was an upheaval of all the principles that maintain social order. The unfortunate consequences of the partition of Poland, foretold back then by many prudent politicians, and regarded by proud politicians as phantoms and imaginary fears, have in fact come true. Never before have the events so far surpassed even the predictions. Today, it is no longer necessary to argue for the harmfulness of the partition of Poland. Suffice it to say how that happened and what followed.

By partitioning Poland, Russia proved that she knows no other measure of justice and injustice than her own convenience and her tsars’ will. Coming to a potency so extraordinary and dangerous to the rest of Europe, Russia made it clear that other states could protect themselves from her only by the force which they were able to use against her.

Thus Austria and Prussia, so as not to remain weaker than their new neighbor, thought themselves forced to follow Russia’s example with regard to Poland, which united them in a common interest of maintaining that lawlessness committed in the form of that appropriation. And Austria and Prussia’s participation in the partition of Poland, which they used to equal their forces with those of Russia, made them too powerful in relation to the rest of Europe.

In that state of affairs, there appeared yet another inconvenience. No command can kill a nation and there is no policy capable of rapidly changing the nature of things, that is, changing the law of God. As soon as a nation has all the elements necessary for its existence, it lives in spite of a death sentence passed on it in treaties and manifestos. Its existence is concealed under an arbitrarily constructed artificial edifice when its destruction is already taken for granted. But one day the nation will move and rise. This is what happened with Poland. Destroyed just when the elements of social life became the most potent in her, she was unable to unite inseparably with the states to which her various parts were incorporated into. Because of all the misfortunes to which they had been subjected, the Poles felt an even stronger sense of their nationality. Hence, the Polish nation had to constantly strive to rise up and integrate, so to speak, its torn members, which certainly exposed the northern states to violent upheavals. The powers that partitioned Poland among themselves became all the more vulnerable to external blows by the very ease with which their power could be shaken by acting on the provinces of the new partition. That became evident when Napoleoniv started his victorious march. That was enough to unite the Poles in distant countries and form Polish legions to fuel the great agitation in all Polish provinces. Thus, through the partitions the three powers only annexed an inseparable enemy and gained subjects who became allies of those powers’ each new enemy, for which they could not even be criticized.

And when semi-independence, that is semi-submission, seemed to be regarded as being half-way between Poland’s complete independence and her political destruction, that half-measure was clutched at the Congress of Vienna. Created was the Kingdom of Poland, which was to exist separately within separate borders but was connected with Russia. A similar existence was promised to all Polish subjects of each of the powers, along with their representation and national institutions despite the Polish lands’ incorporation.

That new measure further exposed the policy of the St. Petersburg cabinet, which treated the freedoms of Poles safeguarded by treaties signed by entire Europe same as it had treated, at the time of the partition of Poland, the independence of the nation protected by the law of nations. Despite the frequently repeated solemn promises and the oaths which obliged the St. Petersburg cabinet to keep them, Russia forgot all the principles which she had pledged to respect in the Kingdom of Poland.

Russia remained faithful to her plans to increase her power and influence in Europe, which she had made evident since her entry into the European state system. After aiding the great European powers in the war against Napoleon, she soon went beyond all measure and to extremes, with her attitude degenerated through the Holy Alliance into open enmity against the freedom of nations. The totally despotic nature of the Russian state shall always make the St. Petersburg cabinet gravitate toward this extreme. Hence, any benefit to Europe through Russia’s opposition to anarchy shall always be outweighed by the abuse of autocracy, which this great power shall expand or strongly support. Russia’s opposition to the spirit of anarchy shall never come from a pure source. It shall never stem from her attachment to true freedom, which is completely foreign to her. And she will always speak out against the abuses of anarchy because she keeps falling into the opposite extreme.

Under the reign of Emperor Alexander,v since the end of the war with France, Russia had remained calm, for that monarch retained a vivid and lasting memory of the dangers that came from the direction of France, which not long ago had threatened him and so many other monarchs and which, likely to recur, captured all his attention. But when Emperor Nicholasvi ascended the throne following Alexander’s death, he immediately proved that the policy of the St. Petersburg cabinet was still directed at partitions and increasing Russia’s power. The new Emperor quickly saw the issue of Greece as a mere opportunity to shake up the Turkish state. Soon, not even that was enough for him. He entered into a deliberate and separate struggle against that power.vii The motives that served as pretext for that war, so pompously declared by Russia before Europe, proved a mere play, same as the apparent nobleness in the salvation of the Turkish state. The Russian cabinet, while making similar statements to keep up the appearances, secretly confessed its plans aimed at obliterating Turkey and placing that vast country under Russia’s control and thus secure her advantage in the east. Those views of the St. Petersburg cabinet, concealed at that time under various appearances or even denied, are all too clearly disclosed in Count von Nesselrode’s official letter to Duke Konstantinviii dated 12 February 1980, where the former informed the latter about how the Turkish issue had ended.

After the events of the recent wars with Turkey and Persia,ix there is no doubt that the east is going to become the main target of the proud intentions of this great power. In the newly seized countries, a despotic government is installed, completely in tune with the government of the whole Russian state and used primarily to increase Russia’s military power. The wealth collected from the levies imposed on the conquered countries is used to replenish the capital invariably allocated toward war costs.

Just recently, with regard to a matter of great importance, the St. Petersburg cabinet demonstrated its usurped right to rule Europe. As far as the new order of things introduced in France by the change of the dynasty is concerned,x Austria, England, and Prussia recognized that by virtue of their right and for the good of Europe they must block all overrunning and partitionist attacks to thus secure the independence of other states and peace in Europe, without interfering in the internal affairs of France. Russia, however, was not interested in preventing the major European powers from declaring themselves against France. The St. Petersburg cabinet did all it could to persuade them to make such a declaration and it even shrank from accrediting an envoy to the new king.

The St. Petersburg Court did the same with regard to Belgium.xi It was the Polish revolution that forced it to postpone but not abandon its plans threatening the freedom of the peoples. The statements recently issued by the Emperor of Russia during negotiations with the Poles clearly prove that those intentions have not been abandoned. The dissension prevailing in France against the foreign powers, and which in this country is inciting many factions to demand war, stems predominantly from Russia’s persistence.

Such is the power which was able to enter the European state system only by destroying Poland and which manages to remain in the system only by Poland’s exclusion from it. Such are the consequences for Europe arising from the partition of Poland.

The harmfulness of these consequences has long been recognized by the powers. Russia was allowed to stay in the European system at the Congress of Vienna not because the powers did not see the danger of letting her stay or because they did not recognize the need for Poland to be brought back to replace Russia. On the contrary, they wished to compensate for the injustice and correct the mistakes that had given rise to the constant disturbances. Thus, the restoration of Poland must have appeared to the powers as a means of not only justice, but also sound politics. England demanded the restoration of Poland in accordance with the wishes of France. Austria offered to return what she had acquired through the partition of Poland. These are the words of Prince Metternichxii from a note of 21 February attached to the minutes of the conference of the five powers:

 

The course of action which the Emperorxiii adhered to in important treaties which have recently determined the fate of the Duchy of Warsaw probably made it clear to the powers that not only the restoration of the Kingdom of Poland independent and subjected to the national Polish government would completely satisfy the wishes of His Imperial Majesty, but even that he would not begrudge the greatest sacrifices for the sake of forging a beneficial alliance restoring the old state of affairs. There is no doubt that this one thing already sufficiently demonstrates that the Emperor does not at all regard what pertains to Poland’s nationality as a reason for jealousy or fear for his country in general. Austria has never seen free independent Poland as a rival or enemy power. And the principles which guided the august predecessors of His Imperial Majesty and His Imperial Majesty himself, even with regard to the partitions of 1773 and 1797, were abandoned only due to a coincidence of circumstances which prevailed and were independent of the will of the Austrian rulers.

 

So complicated were the three powers’ interests that it was almost impossible for Austria and Prussia to return the parts of Poland which they had taken from her through the partitions unless Russia returned the part of Poland in her possession. For the reason why Austria and Prussia participated in the partition of Poland originated from the increase in Russia’s power occasioned by that partition. But the power which was the mainspring of the tearing of Poland apart resisted her restoration the most. With Emperor Alexander possessing both the provinces formerly appropriated from Poland and the Duchy of Warsaw, whose annexation he demanded, treaties could not do. A war with Russia was necessary to enforce the restoration of Poland, and that difficulty seemed insurmountable. Admittedly, it cannot be denied that even at that time the powers demanding the restoration of Poland, if they had been firm in their demand, would have succeeded in achieving the goal so desired, and that is why Lord Castlereagh,xiv whose insistence was so weak, was criticized by the liberal party in England.

If the dangers of the state of affairs to which the partition of Poland gave rise had already been recognized at the Congress of Vienna, it would be difficult to suspect that they would not attract attention today. Did they not further increase due to the St. Petersburg cabinet’s plans, so clearly manifested with regard to Turkey and Persia, as well as France and Belgium? Therefore, the reasons which back then prompted the major powers to demand restoration of Poland are even stronger today.

And there can be no doubt that these powers have a right to repudiate the latest treaties concerning Poland and to conclude new treaties in their place. Russia was the first to violate the treaties by failing to keep their conditions, not only for the benefit of the Poles living the new Kingdom, but also for the benefit of inhabitants of the Polish provinces incorporated into Russia. This enables Poles as well as the powers interested in the fulfillment of these engagements, to leave the area delineated by the Treaty of Vienna. Grotius’ words apply to a similar instance:xv “the individual points of every contract seem to be contained in one another, because of the implicit condition and the caveat that I shall keep my obligations provided that you do what you promised.” (De iure bel. ас pac. lib. III, chapter 19, § 14.) Vattelxvi explains his opinion on this matter no less explicitly:

 

Treaties contain promises that are perfect and reciprocal. If one of the allies fails in his engagements, the other may constrain him to fulfill them; this is the right derived from a perfect promise. But if he has no other way than that of arms to constrain an ally to keep his word, it is sometimes more expedient to disengage himself from his promises, and to break the treaty. He has undoubtedly a right to do this, having promised only upon condition that his ally shall accomplish on his side, every thing he is obliged to perform. The ally offended or injured in what relates to the treaty, may then choose either to oblige the perfidious ally to fulfill his engagement, or declare the treaty broken, by the violation of it. Prudence, and a wise policy must direct him what he ought to do on a particular occasion. [...] Thus all nations are interested to maintain the faith of treaties, to render them every where considered as sacred and inviolable; they also have a right to unite in order to humble him who shows that he despises them, who openly plays with them, who violates, and tramples them under his feet. This is a public enemy who saps the foundations of the repose of nations, and of their common safety. (Droit des gens. liv: II. chapters [13] & 15, § 200 and 222 [respectively])xvii

 

In addition to all this, the obstacles to the plans devised by the powers favorable to us which manifested themselves at the Congress of Vienna have for the most part disappeared. As said above, the greatest difficulty was that [part of] Poland had been incorporated into Russia. But now Poland already has her National Government, which has declared her independent. Her four million inhabitants are armed in order to uphold this resolve, and the initial actions of the regular army have recently proved successful. Soon, the troops of the Polish army are expected to move to other provinces, where an uprising is being prepared. While at the Congress of Vienna, in order to restore Poland, the powers would have had to go to war and shoulder all its burdens, today, Poles themselves have assumed the entire burden, and all that the powers which back then so greatly desired Poland’s restoration should do now is to support the Poles and the stance which they have managed to adopt. Ever since the unfortunate consequences of the partition of Poland were recognized throughout Europe, there has not been a better opportunity to restore her at such little effort or cost; and if missed, this opportunity shall never present itself again.

One does not have to look far for treaties that should have replaced the last political combinations already thwarted by the Poles’ legal rising. Why, plans for these treaties are explicitly laid out in the very provisions of the Congress of Vienna. After experience showed us the impossibility to uphold the points of the agreement reached at the Congress with regard to Poland’s fate, which had been the object of such long and difficult disputes, it would be best to resume the plans which had to be abandoned at that time.

First of all, the favor which the matter deserved at that time and which today has justly intensified and increased should become an impulse to giving Poles all the help they need, without entering into open warfare with Russia. Such assistance could be provided by making public declarations of sympathy for the Polish cause and facilitating Poland’s relations with other European countries, as regards special persons, transport of arms and war supplies, and, last but not least, financial aid and money loans.

Such facilitation would enable Poles to offer strong resistance to their enemies and be certain of success.

That would lead to the situation in which Austria declared to be ready to make the greatest sacrifices to aid the restoration of Poland. It does not seem that Austria’s fulfillment of her declaration should now be subject to conditions different than before.

If, as shown above, Europe has new reasons to fear Russia’s power since the Congress of Vienna, then Austria has the most reason to feel scared; and the fear which Emperor Nicholas’ policy toward Turkey incited in Europe was felt just as keenly by the Viennese court.

It would seem that Prussia should not refuse to return the partitioned Polish provinces either. However, we must confess that this power has not made any clear statements of its readiness in this regard, which the Vienna cabinet declared in the 1814‒1815 treaties. Thus, some difficulties on the part of the Berlin court are to be expected.

In such a state of affairs, the government of His Majesty King of England could adopt the following course of action. As soon as the events take this turn, His cabinet, along with the Vienna cabinet, could recognize Poland’s independence, and Austria could return her partitions to Poland. The Berlin court could be called on to a similar act of recognition and return. Should this court grant this request, Poland’s independence would be recognized and it would stretch over all Polish lands. Should it refuse, the recognition would be only on the part of England and Austria, and would apply only to the lands owned by Prussia and Russia. France, the Ottoman Porte, Sweden, and all other European powers could be called upon to accede to this recognition. Russia could be notified about that and called on to cease her hostilities against Poland. England, Austria, and Turkey would then form a resilient alliance with Poland, and should Russia refuse to stop her hostilities against Poland, these powers would send reinforcements to Poles, and especially England would turn her fleets against Russia in either the Baltic or the Black Sea, where the Porte’s cooperation could prove highly beneficial.

Soon, Russia would have to stop fighting. She would lose the place she had obtained through Poland’s political destruction, and would perhaps regain her former position most appropriate to her and equally appropriate to the best interest of hers and entire Europe. Russia would begin to try to regain her power through internal improvements, through a slow and gradual development of local stock, instead of by invasions and partitions, like she does now. The former Poland, the Poland within the borders marked under King John Sobieski,xviii regaining her place between the powers like back on 3 May 1791, would become, as Lord Castlereagh put it, a buffor state between Russia, Austria, and Prussia. Poland would not pose a threat to either of these countries but would be strong enough to keep them in balance. The Austrian-Prussian relations would return to how they were before the partition of Poland, and these powers’ position in relation to the other neighbors would not worsen, because the powers would still have enough breadth to secure their due influence.

One might object and say that Austria will probably not regard her position with respect to Russia as an obstacle to the execution of the declarations made at the Congress of Vienna; but should Prussia refuse to agree to Poland’s complete restoration, an insurmountable difficulty could arise, for Austria would not allow a decrease in her power relative to Prussia. But is it not evident that since Poland is to recover her lands thus far owned by Russia and Austria, then the possession of the Grand Duchy of Posen shall come to an end, with its return to the Polish state to occur quickly and certainly through the use of Polish forces. Should Prussia refuse to sign the treaties concluded by England and Austria, Austria could declare that renouncing her partitions of Poland, she refuses to give any guarantee to the Prussian partitions as coming from the same source.

The hostile steps which England, according to the plan outlined above, would have to take in order to stop Russia’s hostilities against Poland, could in no way be too burdensome for England. Poland’s military strength would already be greatly augmented by the annexation of Galicia. Called on to join the recognition of Poland and the union that would support her independence, Sweden and Turkey would gladly back England’s strenuous efforts. And in all likelihood, Persia would not neglect to lend her support to the cause. Nor should it be feared that the powers mentioned, thus becoming engaged in the Polish cause against Russia, would also face new trouble. France could be called on to participate in these treaties, and she would undoubtedly eagerly accept the invitation. Her attention would be turned in the same direction, and public opinion in France would not allow the French government to become involved in anything that could hinder the efforts to make Poland independent. Besides, neither England nor Austria would be involved in this matter in such a way so as to lose their peaceful stance by which they would be able to defend themselves against any attack regardless of where it should come from.

Those for whom the present situation in France is a matter of concern might also criticize the plan presented by us in terms of the general state of European interests, by saying that it would be dangerous to introduce such a great change into the present composition of this political body when it needs all its strength to resist the new appropriations; that it would be imprudent, above all, to diminish the power of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, which on the mainland are the cornerstones of this edifice, which might be shaken again, and, last but not least, that this remark speaks mostly in favor of Russia, because it was her who so strongly supported Europe in circumstances similar to those which may soon arise.

This allegation is easy to respond to. Firstly, let us consider that this accusation is based on the principles that occasioned the last partition of Poland. Back then, all the courts united against France agreed to one thing: that the partition of Poland was necessary for them to become stronger in that common struggle. But the motive of momentary necessity did not weaken the impression made by that hateful arrangement, or reverse its disastrous effects, which we have detailed above. To allow Poland to fall again, so soon after her rising from her ashes, to permit her destruction in order to increase the three courts’ power in case of a struggle which may not even come would be a step all the more absurd as the peoples’ opinion about the first partition of Poland is already known. We also know from experience how harmful the annihilation of the Polish nation would be. These harmful effects could be voluntarily perpetuated by indefinitely postponing the use of a remedy so easy to administer today.

And it does not seem fair to argue that to want to suppress the recent agitation in Poland and to continue the political destruction of the Polish nation, would be to increase the three courts’ relative power in relation to France. The partition of Poland turned Poles into ready and most loyal allies to France in the first war that followed. The same thing would happen today to an even larger extent, because a new attempt to destroy Poland would magnify in Poles their former attachment to France.

But let us add that by restoring Poland in the manner set forth above, the three powers would not only lose some of their material forces, which, if they had to be used, would bring them more trouble than benefit, but even the dangers which these powers arm themselves against would disappear or significantly subside.

It is certain that the faction in France that wants war is very numerous today, and it seems certain that should everything in Europe be left unchanged, France would start a war. But let us take a closer look. The faction in question is not homogeneous and it is guided by various rather feeble impulses of which removed could be the most apparent and important ones.

Some of these impulses are common to all who demand war, and the strongest one, which, so to speak, prevails is the constant fear always by the holy aliance. But if it were possible to arrange the Polish affairs in the manner described above, the holy alliance would be no more. A famous politician called post-partition Poland the bloodstained cradle of the holy alliance. With the restoration of Poland, this holy union would disappear forever. The initial impulse for the holy alliance came from Russia — its cornerstone. As soon as the restoration of Poland shakes this cornerstone, the whole edifice built on 26 September 1815, where there was never room for England, would come tumbling down.

All that has been said above about Russia’s plans against France and Belgium clearly proves that the Polish troops are nothing but the French troops’ advance guard, and that after defeating the Poles, the Russians would soon stand on the Rhine. The French must, therefore, succor Poles for their own defense, especially since these two nations share so many mementos dear to both of them. And as soon as Poland is restored in the manner stated above, the reason for war shall immediately disappear. The French will be glad to see Poles independent and happy, and France’s fears will be relieved as soon as a barrier against Russia stands ready through Poland’s restoration.

The remaining impulses for war, like conquest and universal rule in Europe, are evidently exaggerated. The faction that adopted them is very small and would never be able to take the upper hand in deliberations of the French people. But even supposing that this faction prevails, how great the difference in the future successes would be between a war commenced to protect France from Russia by aiding Poland, and a war undertaken for the sole purpose of conquest and destruction. As right and just, the former motive for war would enjoy public opinion’s support, without which today even the greatest power becomes impotent. The resistance to France coming to the aid of Poland would be most in line with the spirit in Europe, while the French war of conquest would certainly turn public opinion against itself. Austria and Prussia would gain real strength with the respect they would command by defending a just cause against France’s appropriations; which would make nations and even France herself change their minds about these two powers’ stance and evaluation. They would no longer be regarded neither as still hostile to the cause of liberty nor as powers against whom it is always beneficial to fight and not leave them in peace as long as there is a way to wage war. And should Austria and Prussia, at England’s behest, accept such an arrangement with regard to Poland, by which France would gain a bulwark against Russia for her liberal institutions, then these two powers, by letting France participate in the agreements which could occur in this respect, would easily gain new assurances from France for the security of their lands bordering on it and a solemn confirmation of the earlier treaties. This remark too could be forcefully submitted to the Berlin cabinet to convince it to return the lands snatched away from Poland. One should not doubt that public opinion in France will support agreements equally aimed at liberty and the mutual security of European countries and peoples.

Finally, it would be most imprudent to maintain that Poland, having returned to the rank of independent countries, would not conform to the universal order of European nations, or that as her aspirations are uncertain, it is impossible to predict how she would enter this society. Why, the great agitation that has recently occurred in Poland is not aimed at forming a new political body of unknown, so to speak, properties, natural weight, various affinities, various degrees of congruity to other bodies in the same system, or gravitating toward the common center. The recent revolution in Poland is a restoration of the old order. Her nation is to return to its former existence, enriched by the experience of over half a century of misfortunes. Her government is not a government of yesterday, a government which would feel isolated from all other governments, a government that would remain in opposition to the order of things that has lasted for centuries and which in its progress would get in the way of everything that neighbors it. On the contrary, it is a nation contemporary to the most ancient European nations, and which is to retake its place among the others. Poland has her own historical traditions and mementos. She has the colors of nationality in her institutions, vivid and clear colors that could never be erased. This resource of nationality has always been an object of her devotion and care. Poles in their internal organization have never deviated from the path of gradual improvement. They have never let themselves be carried away by detached ideas, which elsewhere sometimes caused disturbances. Their inseparability from the past, from the legends and the faith of their ancestors, as well as from their lands’ location, were so strengthened in their nation, despite what it had gone through, that Napoleon himself, whom they had many expectations about, and who had such great power over their minds, thought himself compelled to respect their nationality in the institutions which he bestowed upon them, often against the principles which he adhered to, constantly striving to organize countries and nations into one generic form which he had devised and to which he sacrificed all the local aspects.

The history of the Polish nation can dispel many an important doubt that could be cast today on the manner in which it is to reunite with other European nations. If anyone wanted to know whether plans of appropriation, partitions, and universal monarchy would find strong support in Poland, her past would immediately show that for centuries her nation was Europe’s bulwark against the invasions of the Muscovites and Tatars, that she had been a faithful ally of Austria, whose monarchy she saved under the walls of its capital from the doom threatened by barbarians; that the recent vicissitudes which Poland has gone though gave her a sense of the significance and sanctity of the principle of national independence; that when in the Napoleonic era, Poles were faithful to Napoleon’s banners, it was not because they shared all his views and principles, but because they saw him as their savior and avenger of the wrongs which the European powers had committed or permitted others to commit against them. They did not think that they had paid too dearly for the faint glimmer of hope with which the star of that great man had illumined their misery, for which they paid with their own blood.

In many other respects, Poland, in her new relations, would follow the way in which the powers would now act toward her. The old memories of friendship, the gratitude to England for the principles she has always believed in with regard to Poland, the love of freedom equal among these two nations, which even preceded the new advances of liberal institutions — all this has already established a very close relationship between England and Poland. As for Austria, Poland does remember that this power was almost forced to participate in her partition. Poland also recalls the statements made by the Viennese cabinet at the Congress of Vienna in favor of the restoration of Poland. Hence, Poland is deeply convinced that Austria will now abide by her declarations. Last but not least, the Porte is a former ally of Poland and as much Russia’s natural enemy as Poland. The Porte solemnly declared its objection to the partition of Poland, which made Poland indebted to it. If, therefore, by way of a resounding act of justice, strongly supported by England, made by Austria and supported in its effects by these two powers, acting jointly with the Porte, which would mean that Poland partly owes them her restoration, then her relations with these countries would be even closer. The same would happen with regard to Sweden, if she supported the Polish cause in the way indicated above.

In addition to this, the powers that would aid Poland now could sign treaties with her to assure mutual assistance if necessary.

As for England in particular, Poland is England’s natural ally due to her geographical and statistical location and also as an agricultural country. England would find in Poland a favorable outlet for her products, and could offer Poland an outlet for the Polish grain exports; for in a similar state of affairs, the English legislature too could adopt modifications in this respect which would be favorable to the Polish-English trade.

Even the election of the ruler, which is yet to take place in Poland, could combine the special interests of Poland with the general interests of the European system and the interests of the powers most interested in maintaining this order.

All these remarks show that the restoration of Poland, carried out in the manner presented in our letter, would not only not violate the order established in Europe, but would strengthen it even further.

Poland will be independent, because she has in herself all the elements constituting a nation — great, youthful, and vigorous. The astonishing events that have recently occurred in Poland are new proof that her nation cannot be destroyed. All the hesitations and excuses of politics which have refused to recognize this truth have brought no effect. The Polish struggle against despotism, to which our country has been sacrificed several times over the past sixty years, must finally come to an end. Europe will certainly come to Poland’s aid, and this can happen in two ways. Either Poland receives substantial help through voluntary cooperation of all the nations particularly affected by her great cause, which at the same time would solidify the order of things in Europe; or she will receive help from France alone, forced to start a war against entire Europe, or rather against all the rulers, which could again upset all Europe. The actions against Russia which would inevitably have to be made by England in support of Poland’s independence, would have the effect of averting war, a bloody and inevitable one if Poland is forced to seek help elsewhere than in the London cabinet’s noble prospects and in the Vienna and Berlin cabinets’ sense of justice.

 

This is a translation of the Polish language version printed in: Nota podana lordowi Palmerston S. S. J. K. M. króla angielskiego przez margrabiego Wielopolskiego posłannika Polski w marcu 1831 (Warsaw, 1831).