Czechs and Slovaks towards Russia. Traditions and the present

Interview with Professor Piotr Bajda

- In the 19th century, in Bohemia, which was part of the Habsburg monarchy, Russophilia, a tendency towards Slavophilism, was fashionable. Can these tendencies be explained mainly by the Czechs’ struggle with German demands at the time? To what extent were they a political calculation and to what extent an expression of spiritual or cultural inclination? Did they really then help the Czechs?

It seems that Czech Russophilia was a gesture of self-defence, a dramatic search for some way out of the political arrangement shutting down after the fall of the Spring of Nations, which threatened to denationalise Czechness and relegate it to folklore. Vienna’s failure to agree to a change in the political model towards a multinational empire, limited to power-sharing between Austrians and Hungarians, pushed Slav minorities to the margins. Under these circumstances, Tsarist Russia seemed not even so much as the best, rather as the only potential partner. In my view, this was primarily a political calculation, as cultural ties were practically non-existent. For the Czechs, Russia as the liberator of the Slavic peoples was an imagined, theoretical construct, linked to the failure of efforts to gain greater autonomy from Vienna. It is perhaps worth recalling that the considerable in scope Slavic Congress held in Prague in 1848 deliberated under the slogans of Austro-Slavism, that is, the unification of the Slavic peoples under Habsburg rule. The lack of a positive reaction from the emperor and, even more, the crashing of the congress by the Austrian authorities under the pretext of student riots, were all seen as the downfall of the original idea. The love for the tsars as defenders of Slavism was above all to see Russia as an effective instrument of liberation from foreign rule, rallying its triumphs in winning the war against Turkey in 1878, which brought independence to the Bulgarians. This was the greatest temptation for the Czechs and the main basis for the growing misunderstanding with the Polish independence movement.

- In his writings written before the First World War, Tomáš Masaryk was a critic of Russia. Did this translate into his policy already at the helm of the Czechoslovak government after the First World War? To what extent did the change from Tsarist to Red Russia affect the Czech perception of Russia?

This criticism by the pre-war Masaryk was prompted by this philosopher and humanist’s distaste for tsarist authoritarianism. But over the years, the more Masaryk became a politician and the less a professor, his views on Russia, whatever it was, evolved. He himself had the interesting experience of looking at Russia after the February Revolution of 1917, and it was probably then that he noticed that, despite the enormous chaos caused by the civil war in the east, there was a force to be reckoned with and to be dealt with.

It was also for this reason that Masaryk strove to extend the borders of First Czechoslovakia to include Transcarpathian Ruthenia, in order to have a land connection with Soviet Russia, as in his estimation a desirable ally. He even saw in revolutionary Russia the forces of progress that proclaimed the slogans of the self-determination of nations, as he wrote about in his book published at the end of World War I, titled “Nová Evropa. Stanovisko Slovanské”. The plan for this alliance failed due to the victory of the Polish army over the Bolsheviks and the borders drawn a short while later in the Treaty of Riga. Hence Masaryk’s naivety that the Soviets would not be interested in conquering Czechoslovakia, that the communisation of Poland would be enough for them. At the same time, as Professor Andrzej Nowak pointed out in one of his excellent books “the first betrayal of the West. 1920 – the forgotten appeasement”, Masaryk was convinced of Poland’s demise in 1920, and regarded any attempts to help Warsaw as a waste of time and energy. This attitude of the authorities in Prague, plus the conflict over Zaolzie, were the main causes of hostile Polish-Czechoslovak relations in the interwar period.

- How did the nascent Slovak national movement view Russia? Like the Czechs in opposition to the Germans, did the Slovaks build their attitude to Russia in opposition to the Hungarians?

The Slovaks did indeed see in Russia a force that could hinder the process of Magyarisation. But their approach was very different from that of the Czechs. The de facto lack of elites meant that the awakener of modern Slovak identity and leader of the 1848-49 anti-Hungarian uprising Ľudovít Štúr, in his pre-mortem political manifesto titled “Slavism and the Future World”, seeing the weakness of the small Slavic nations, including the Slovaks, postulated that all Slavs should adhere to Russia, adopt Russian culture, language and religion.

- Did the Slovaks’ proximity to the Soviet Union give rise to significant differences in their approach to it, as compared to the Czechs?

The border with the Soviet Union was not established until 1945, and it is difficult to see that this neighbourhood was somehow more clearly perceived differently by Slovaks than by Czechs. Perhaps the Slovaks were a little closer because they supported the Slovak National Uprising, which broke out at the end of September 1944 at the rear of the German defensive lines. In addition, eastern Slovakia was largely inhabited by Ruthenian and Ukrainian minorities. It was not until the first years of the installation of the communist system and the persecution of believers (including the liquidation of the Uniate Church and religious orders) that another unknown face of the Soviets was revealed.

- How did the years of communist enslavement and dependence on the Soviet Union (with the most drastic manifestation of this in the form of the 1968 intervention) affect the attitude of Czechs and Slovaks towards Russia? Did they identify communism with it, or did they believe that the USSR should be treated separately, as a specific, “supra-Russian” creation?

This is an interesting question that would be quicker answered by a historian than by a political scientist. As far as I have been able to touch on this issue when researching political elites in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the matter looks a little different than in Poland. First of all, the Red Army was not stationed in Czechoslovakia until 1968; there were, of course, Soviet advisors in the first years after the communists took power (as a result of the so-called February Coup of 1948), but communism was not brought directly on Soviet bayonets. In the first competitive and free elections in Czechoslovakia after the war, held at the end of May 1946, the communists won ahead of the democratic parties. To be more precise, the communists won in the Czech Republic, in the Slovakian territories the winner was the Democratic Party. Nevertheless, in the 300-seat Constituent Assembly, the Communists had 114 MPs, so their leader Klement Gottwald was entrusted with the post of Prime Minister in the coalition government.

Czechoslovakia’s path to communist dictatorship thus had two interesting repercussions. Firstly, the Slovaks regarded the February coup as a Czech intrigue, so that the communists who won in the Czech Republic could take power leaving out of it the otherwise decisive Slovaks. Secondly, Czechoslovak communism was regarded largely as its own, only inspired and supported by Moscow. This was much corrected after the intervention of Warsaw Pact troops in August 1968, although the interveners were more identified with the Soviets than the Russians. Sometimes, even in Czech or Slovak pro-Russian circles, attempts were made to whitewash the role of the Russians and to emphasise the Ukrainian origin of the commander-in-chief of the intervention, General Ivan Pavlovski.

- What, after 1989/1990, primarily defined the attitude of “ordinary” Czechs and Slovaks towards Russia? Were the policies of successive Czech and Slovak governments a reflection of these social attitudes?

Having observed political life in the Czech Republic and Slovakia for years, I would probably say that in the beginning it was a relief. The Red Army stationed in Czechoslovakia since 1968 had finally left, the border guards guarding the Iron Curtain were not firing. Later, differences emerged. The Czechs, with their reforms, wanted to fit in as quickly as possible with the Western model of a liberal economy, while the Slovaks were concerned about the closing of markets in the east or the uncertainty of their position as a transit country for Russian energy resources. Hence, the temptation to be a bridge between Russia and the West quickly emerged in Bratislava. A temptation that the Czechs did not have for a while, at most the Czech issue could be seen to tolerate Russian investment in real estate and the settlement of those Russians who were rich, but not wealthy enough to afford London or the Côte d’Azur.

- To what extent were the Czech and Slovak policies towards Russia autonomous, and to what extent did they reflect trends in policies towards Russia by the US, Germany, or France?

There is no simple answer to this question. Contemporary international relations, their multidimensionality, makes it very difficult to pursue a fully autonomous policy in one direction alone; it is always a resultant of various circumstances and trends. Much also depended on specific political leaders. When Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar, who was responsible for Bratislava’s international isolation and lack of an invitation to join the EU and NATO, was ousted from power in Slovakia in 1998, his successor Mikuláš Dzurinda would have liked to have been ostentatiously pro-Western; on the other hand, the recently still-in-office Czech President Miloš Zeman saw an opportunity to prove his independence in emphasising his pro-Russianism until the outbreak of war in Ukraine.

- There is often talk of Russian influence in various countries – corrupting parts of the political class and opinion-making circles, using economic instruments (especially the supply of raw materials), fuelling internal conflicts and unrest. Were the Czech Republic and Slovakia also subjected to such treatments? What did Russia do to pursue its interests in these two countries?

Raw materials are not the only instrument used by the Russians. On the example of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, one can see how profiled, not to say individualised, the message addressed to both nations is. In the Czech Republic, it was done more subtly, showing the achievements of Russian culture, enthusing Russian millionaires about settling in the Czech Republic, in Prague, Karlovy Vary, finally showing themselves as a discriminated society. To this day, a conference organised a few years ago in Prague by lecturers from a university unknown to anyone, with the interesting title, “Russophobia – anti-Semitism of the 21st century” is available on one social network. Since the outbreak of war in Ukraine, such courtesy has been limited to communist and far-right circles.

In Slovakia, apart from exploiting the sentiment towards Russians initiated by Štúr’s thought, as I mentioned above, one of the largest NGOs is the Slovak-Russian Friendship Society. Moscow takes advantage of the entire network of business links and dependencies built up especially in 1993-1998, including the system created at that time making Bratislava dependent on Russian energy resources and budget revenues from its status as a transit state. The latter meant that any Ukrainian-Russian disputes and past observed blockades by Russia in the transmission of gas to the west automatically hit Slovakia with great force.

However, what still characterised Russia’s policy towards the Czech Republic and Slovakia was, until recently, the observed huge overrepresentation of Russian diplomats accredited in Prague and Bratislava. Only in recent years has it been possible to drastically reduce their numbers.

- How have the Czech Republic and Slovakia coped with these Russian efforts? Or how did they not cope. Were there clear differences depending on who was in power?

It is interesting that the Czech Republic (along with Estonia) established the first state-run centres in our region to combat hybrid threats, mainly Russian. The Czech counter-intelligence service BIS warns against Russian influence every year in its public reports. Thus, we can speak of a systematic and consistent fight against Russian influence and against Moscow’s actions. The intensity and form of these actions has been little affected by the ideological differences of the individual ruling cabinets in Prague.

The situation is far worse in Slovakia. There, the nature of the individual governments has a dominant influence on the Slovak response to Russian actions. Slovakia’s 2020-2023 rulers were very assertive towards the Russians, joined in European actions to expel Russian diplomats, practically rushed to Kiev’s aid with the first shots fired in Ukraine. However, with Robert Fico taking over, the climate changed dramatically; already in his exposé he indicated that his foreign policy would be conducted on four sides of the world and not unipolar like the one of his predecessors. The new foreign minister Juraj Blanár organised an alternative celebration of the Slovak National Uprising in Žilina last September, to which he invited the ambassadors of Russia and Belarus (who were absent from the official state celebrations) to thank the Red Army for the liberation of Czechoslovakia. There have been statements in the media by ruling politicians that the sanctions imposed on Russia are ineffective and it would be best to force the Ukrainians to start peace talks with Moscow.

- Is the attitude of the Czech and Slovak elites towards Russia to some extent a result of ideological views? There are countries where a positive attitude towards Russia is shown by both extreme left-wing circles and a part of conservative circles, who believe that Putin’s Russia resists liberal offensiveness and is therefore, at least in this respect, worth praising. Does a similar phenomenon occur at our southern neighbours?

In part, I have already spoken about the attitude of Czech and Slovak elites towards Russia earlier, but it may be worth taking this opportunity to highlight threads not yet present in our discussion. In the case of the pro-Russian Czech elites, we can say that pragmatism dominates over ideology among them. It is an attempt to manage a part of the electorate of the older generation sentimentally pro-Russian and the younger voters, who are anti-system, anti-globalist, on the internal political scene, even in the case of the Czech communists it is not a defence of Moscow as a world leader. In the case of the conservatives in power today, headed by Prime Minister Petr Fiala and his coalition partners, there is no temptation to use Russia as a defence against liberalism. Czech conservatives have not been seduced by Putin’s ploys, as if he alone is prepared to defend conservative values in the face of the rottenness of the West. Moreover, for Fiala himself, not only a politician but also a political scientist, Russia is the centre of evil and the greatest threat to European security.

- What were the initial reactions of the Czech and Slovak countries to Russia’s attack on Ukraine? What was the reaction at the level of government policy, and how in the social sphere? Were there major differences in approach between political forces and divisions among the societies of these countries?

This is exactly what I had the opportunity to write about in one of my last articles published by the Institute de Republica, so I certainly tried to study the reaction of both politicians and the two societies in detail beforehand. The outbreak of the war came as a shock to both nations and was met with widespread condemnation, while the first victims of the war – Ukrainian refugees – received a warm welcome in both the Czech Republic and Slovakia. But that is where the similarities end, because already research conducted even before the war by the Slovak think yes Globsec showed that the majority of Slovaks blamed NATO and not Russia as the party responsible for the increase in international tension, this was the opposite of the indications in the Czech Republic. Robert Fico, who was in opposition at the beginning of 2022, built his political message on these anti-Western or, more precisely, anti-American sentiments, and it was largely thanks to this that he was able to win the elections scheduled for 30 September.

In contrast, thanks to the fact that both countries were governed by pro-U.S. coalitions at the start of the war in Ukraine – the government of Eduard Heger in Slovakia and Petr Fiala in the Czech Republic – the attitude of both cabinets was very similar. It is true that Heger did not take part in the trip of the prime ministers of Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia to Kiev in mid-March 2022, but he later admitted at a press conference that staying in Bratislava was a mistake. In turn, on his return to Prague, Prime Minister Fiala, asked at a press conference whether he was afraid going to Kiev under fire, said: “there are such moments in life that it does not matter if you are afraid, but it is important to behave as you should”. Both governments in return immediately made a snap decision to provide multi-vectoral support to Ukraine from military to diplomatic assistance.

- What factors determined the evolution of Czech and Slovak policy towards Russia in the following months, in fact already years of the war (their attitude towards sanctions packages, arms transfers to Ukraine, aid to Ukrainian refugees, bilateral relations with Moscow)? Was it more a consideration of domestic politics, or more an assessment of the international situation, both what Russia was doing and the reaction to it by key Western players?

The main factor was internal considerations, changes in public sentiment, especially in Slovakia, where public fatigue with the scale of aid to Ukraine was more rapid. After all, it has to be said that the Slovak army was in practice disarmed, largely based on post-Soviet armaments, which Slovakia got rid of thanks to the transfer to Ukraine. That is why one of Fica’s first decisions after his election victory was to withhold all military aid from the army depots. No such rift can be seen in the Czech Republic ruled since November 2021 by Petr Fiala. If at all, then at most after the presidential election in January 2023 won by retired general Petr Pavel who wanted to bring his own components to the discussion of the situation in Ukraine when he stated that Kiev had no chance of winning over Russia.

- How do differences in policy towards Russia affect Czech and Slovak relations with Hungary? Were they already an important factor before the attack on Ukraine, or did this attack only mark a turning point? Victor Orban’s policy towards Russia is much talked about and criticised. Do you see it as merely a political and economic calculation? Do you also see an ideological thread in it?

Both questions are invariably interesting. First, the Czech Republic and Slovakia vis-à-vis Hungary. Budapest’s policy primarily inflames emotions in Bratislava, with little resonance in discussions in Prague. This is easy to explain, according to the last census more than 8% of the citizens of the Slovak Republic are ethnic Hungarians, the entire southern Slovak border is a neighbourhood with Hungary. The Czechs are not neighbours with Hungary. All this makes the Hungarians a permanent presence in Slovak discourse. For the Czechs, Prime Minister Orban’s policy is at best some kind of systemic error that weakens regional cooperation and gives a pretext for limiting contacts in the Visegrad Group, which is particularly evident now during the Czech presidency of the V4.

The situation has changed after the recent elections in Slovakia, as it is clear that Prime Minister Robert Fico echoes Orban in his statements about the war in Ukraine, the need to start peace talks, the futility of imposing sanctions on Russia etc.

On the other hand, as to the nature of Hungarian-Russian relations, there is no simple answer. It seems to me that at the first moment we could talk about Orban’s political pragmatism. After the annexation of Crimea and the first sanctions imposed on Russia, Hungary was the only one to host Putin, becoming a kind of link between Moscow and the European Union. On the other hand, the Budapest-Brussels disputes and Hungary’s peculiar isolation in the European Union meant that maintaining relations with Russia was a way out of this oppression. But in recent times, it seems that this original pragmatism is receding into the background. Orban is clearly building his position on insisting that no one understands Hungarians, that Hungarians are a nation with no comparison in Europe, and he is finding more and more of a soul mate in Putin’s Russia. All this is compounded by the difficult Hungarian-Ukrainian relationship. There is no denying that until the outbreak of war in Ukraine, relations with Budapest, as well as other central European capitals, were not paramount in Kiev’s politics. In addition, Hungary, always sensitive to issues of protecting its minorities living in neighbouring states, and there are around 150,000 Hungarians living in the Transcarpathian Oblast, especially since 2017 accused Kiev of systemic discrimination against them. This was an additional factor that made Orban more sympathetic to Putin’s policies than President Zelenski’s.

In contrast, these years of close bilateral relations have led to changes in the attitudes of Hungarian society. Globsec, cited above, carried out research in the region a few years ago, which showed that the youngest generation of Hungarians sympathises with Russia and sees Moscow as a strategic partner, in contrast to the older generation, which remembers the suppression of the 1956 uprising or the communist years. This change in the attitude of the youngest Hungarians seems to me to be the most dangerous one, and one that has a negative impact on the future of our relations in the Central European region.

- Thank you for the interview.